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Abstract 
 
Mullainathan et al [Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 2008] present a model of 
coarse thinking or analogy based thinking. The essential idea behind coarse thinking is 
that people put situations into categories and the values assigned to attributes in a given 
situation are affected by the values of corresponding attributes in other co-categorized 
situations. We test this hypothesis in an experiment on financial options against the 
benchmark of arbitrage-free pricing. Firstly, we test whether a financial option is priced 
in analogy with its underlying stock (transference). Secondly, we test for whether 
variations in the analogy between a financial option and its underlying stock matter 
(framing). We find evidence in support of both transference and framing. 
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Does Coarse Thinking Matter for Derivative Pricing? Evidence from an Experiment 
 
 
In an interesting paper, Mullainathan, Schwartzsein & Shleifer (2008) put forward a 
model of coarse thinking. Their model is based on the notion that agents use analogies for 
assigning values to attributes (the attribute valued in their model is “quality”). The 
defining idea behind coarse thinking is that agents co-categorize situations that they 
consider to be analogous and assessment of attributes in a given situation is affected by 
other situations in the same category. This is in contrast with rational (Bayesian) thinking 
in which each situation is evaluated according to its own merits. Even though coarse 
thinking appears to be a natural way of modeling how humans process information 
(Kahneman & Tversky (1982), Lakoff (1987), Edelmen (1992), Zaltman (1997), and 
Carpenter, Glazer, & Nakamoto (1994)), empirical evidence on the issue is difficult to 
gather. It is clearly difficult to isolate coarse thinking from confounding explanations. 
However, experimental methods appear to be particularly suited for this task due to 
greater control that they offer. 
  Mullainathan et al (2008) use the advertising theme of Alberto Culver Natural 
Silk Shampoo as a motivating example to explain coarse thinking. The shampoo was 
advertised with a slogan “We put silk in the bottle.” The company actually put some silk 
in the shampoo. However, as conceded by the company spokesman, silk does not do 
anything for hair (Carpenter et al (1994)). Then, why did the company put silk in the 
shampoo? Mullainathan et al (2008) write that the company was relying on the fact that 
consumers co-categorize shampoo with hair. This co-categorization leads consumers to 
value “silk” in shampoo because they value “silky” in hair (clearly not a rational 
response). That is, a positive trait from hair is transferred to shampoo by adding silk to it. 
Such transfer of the informational content of an attribute across co-categorized situations 
is termed transference. An important question is, how are categories formed in the first 
place? A natural response is to say that clues about category formation must come from 
the description of the situation under consideration. Mullainathan et al (2008) call such 
inference framing. The way a situation is described or framed affects its subsequent 
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categorization. Hence, framing and transference are two concepts associated with coarse 
thinking. 
 In this paper, we address the question of whether the way investors price financial 
options in a controlled laboratory experiment is affected by coarse thinking. We use a 
simple framework that allows us to distinguish between the hypotheses of coarse thinking 
and arbitrage-free pricing. We find that the hypothesis of coarse thinking has a 
significantly greater explanatory power over the benchmark of arbitrage-free pricing. We 
find evidence in favor of framing as well as transference. 
 Coarse thinking or analogy based reasoning is likely to play an important role in 
understanding financial market behavior. Many researchers have pointed out that there 
appears to be clear departures from Bayesian thinking (Babcock & Loewenstein (1997), 
Babcock, Wang, & Loewenstein (1996), Hogarth & Einhorn (1992), Kahneman & 
Frederick (2002), Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky (1982)). Such departures from rational 
thinking have been measured both at the individual as well as the market level (Siddiqi 
(2008), Kluger & Wyatt (2004)). However, the question of what type of behavior to 
allow for if non-Bayesian behavior is admitted is a difficult one to address in the absence 
of an alternative which is amenable to systematic analysis. Coarse thinking may provide 
such an alternative especially when the intuitive appeal of analogy based reasoning is 
undeniable. 
 This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the hypothesis of arbitrage-
free pricing as well as the hypothesis of coarse thinking and derives each hypothesis’s 
price predictions in the context of our experiment. Section 3 describes the experimental 
design. Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Arbitrage-Free Pricing vs. Coarse Thinking 
 
The concept of arbitrage-free pricing is based on the portfolio replication argument. The 
portfolio replication argument (also known as the law of one price) states that two 
portfolios with identical payoffs must be identically priced. According to this principle, in 
order to price an asset, one only needs to find a portfolio that exactly replicates the 
payoffs of the asset. The price of the asset in question must then be equal to the cost of 
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the replicating portfolio. If this principle is violated then an arbitrage opportunity will 
arise. Portfolio replication argument forms the heart of modern asset pricing theory. As 
one example, the Black-Scholes option pricing formula derived in Black, Scholes, & 
Merton (1974) is an application of this principle.  
 
2.1 Arbitrage-Free Pricing 
 
Consider a call option with payoffs 1C , 2C , and 3C  corresponding to states Red (R), Blue 
(B), and Green (G). There other assets 1B , 2B , and 3B with prices 1p , 2p , and 3p are 
available. Table 1 shows the payoffs associated with each asset in each state. All payoffs 
are non-negative. 
 
Table 1 
Price Asset Type State R State B State G 
? Call 1C  2C  3C  
1p  1B  1X  2X  3X  
2p  2B  1Y  2Y  3Y  
3p  3B  Z  Z Z 
 
In order to calculate the arbitrage-free price of the call option, consider a (replicating) 
portfolio consisting of a units of 1B , b units of 2B , and c units of 3B  such that: 
 
111 CcZbYaX =++ , 222 CcZbYaX =++ , & 333 CcZbYaX =++  
 
Given such a (payoff replicating) portfolio, according to the portfolio replication 
argument, the arbitrage-free price of the call option is 321 cpbpap ++ . Hence, arbitrage-
free price provides a sharply defined benchmark for rational pricing. This benchmark is 
the cornerstone of modern finance.  
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2.2 Option Pricing with Coarse Thinking 
 
Suppose all three states are equally likely to occur.1 The price of any asset with coarse 
thinking depends on how it is categorized. Suppose the call option we have been 
considering has 1B as the underlying asset and has k as the striking price (a call option is 
an instrument that gives the buyer the right but not the obligation to purchase the 
underlying asset ( 1B  in this case) at a specified price called the striking price k ). For 
simplicity, assume one period marked by two points in time. The current time is date 0 
and the option yields a payoff (expires) at date 1, at which point one of the three possible 
states is realized. It follows, 
 
}0),max{( 11 kXC −= , }0),max{( 22 kXC −= , & }0),max{( 33 kXC −=  
 
As can be seen, the payoffs in the three states depend on the payoffs from 1B  in 
the corresponding states. Furthermore, by appropriately changing the striking price k , the 
call option can be made more or less similar to the underlying instrument 1B , with the 
similarity becoming exact as k approaches zero (all payoffs are constrained to be non-
negative).2 A call option more similar to 1B  is more likely to be co-categorized with 1B   
by coarse thinkers (framing).  
We set up an alternative hypothesis to the arbitrage-free pricing as follows. Given 
co-categorization of the call option with 1B , coarse thinkers choose a price for the option 
that equates the expected return on the option with the expected return on 1B  
(transference). That is, the attribute being transferred from 1B  to the call option is the 
expected return. A coarse thinker is solving for the price of the call option by analogy 
with the underlying stock. The underlying stock has a certain link between the payoffs 
and price, which is captured by the concept of expected return. While pricing with 
                                                 
1 Knowledge of the likelihood of states is needed to derive the coarse thinking price. This information is not 
required to derive the arbitrage-free price. 
 
2 In the context of the portfolio replication argument, this similarity can be understood as being captured by 
the value of a in the replicating portfolio. Higher the value of a , higher is the similarity between the 
underlying instrument and the option being replicated.  
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analogy, it makes sense to transfer the same link to the asset being priced. Denoting the 
call price by CP , the coarse thinking hypothesis with transference of expected return 
implies, 
 
1
321
321
p
XXX
CCC
PC ×
++
++
=  
 
The coarse thinking hypothesis provides a precisely defined alternative to the benchmark 
of arbitrage-free pricing. For comparison, table 2 shows prices under both hypotheses. 
 
 
 
 
3. Experimental Design 
 
The experiment is designed to test the explanatory power of coarse thinking hypothesis 
against the benchmark of arbitrage-free pricing. Arbitrage-free pricing is the rational way 
of pricing a financial asset whereas coarse thinking or pricing with analogy appears to be 
the most natural way. Specifically, we test for whether a call option is priced in analogy 
with the underlying asset (transference of expected return). We also test for whether 
changing the similarity affects the analogy (framing) as it should if coarse thinking 
indeed matters. 
 
3.1 Overview 
 
We use an extension of the design used in Rockenbach (2004). In Rockenbach (2004), a 
number of hypotheses related to mental accounting are tested against the hypothesis of 
Table 2 
Call Option Price 
Coarse Thinking (Transference of Expected Return) Arbitrage-Free Pricing 
1
321
321
p
XXX
CCC
PC ×
++
++
=  
321 cpbpapPC ++=  
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arbitrage-free pricing. Here, we create an extension of the design by varying the striking 
price in order to evaluate the explanatory power of the coarse thinking hypothesis. We 
will come back to the significance of similarities and differences between our design and 
the design in Rockenbach (2004) when we discuss our results. 
We conducted 6 treatments, each with 30 participants. Different participants were 
used in each treatment. In each treatment, there were 60 trials per subject. There was no 
interaction between participants. Hence, a total of 1800 independent observations per 
treatment were generated. Participants were given value-neutral labels. That is, terms like 
call option or the underlying asset were not used. Rather, value-neutral labels ( A  for the 
call option and 1B  for the underlying asset) were used. Participants were undergraduate 
students at ______________________. Each participant was paid at the end of his or her 
60 allotted trials. Payoffs were denominated in a fictitious currency called francs. An 
exchange rate of 0.001 Rs/Francs was specified at the outset and was kept fixed 
throughout the treatments. Average payout per participant was Rs 161. There was no 
explicit time limit in the experiment. The average duration of a treatment was about 2 
hours. The program for the experiment is developed in z-Tree.3 A calculator was built 
into the program to assist participants with calculations. A participant can experiment 
with different values. Decisions in a trial are not finalized till the participant presses a 
button labeled “Done”. Once finalized, a new trial is presented. 
 
3.2 Treatments 
 
Table 3 shows the parameters used in treatment 1(T1). As can be verified, payoffs 
from A are equivalent to the payoffs from 1B  minus 65 (the striking price). In treatment 2 
(T2), everything remains the same, except that the striking price becomes 70. That is, the 
payoffs from A  in T2 are equivalent to the payoffs from 1B  minus 70. There were 6 
treatments corresponding to the striking prices 65 (T1), 70 (T2), 75 (T3), 80 (T4), 85 
(T5), and 90 (T6). As explained earlier, participants were given value-neutral labels for 
assets. They were given the payoff tables without explaining that payoffs from A are 
                                                 
3 Urs Fischbacher (2007): z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments, 
Experimental Economics 10(2), 171-178  
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equivalent to payoffs from 1B  minus a constant (or 0 in a given state if the payoff from 
the underlying minus the striking price is negative in that state).  
Table 4 shows the payoffs associated with A in each treatment. Note, that the 
treatments can be broadly classified into sets. In set 1, comprising of T1, T2, and T3, 
payoff in each state is positive. In set 2, consisting of T4, T5, and T6, one payoff (Green 
State) is 0. Will coarse thinkers show different behavior in set 1 when compared with set 
2?  In set 1, the analogy with the underlying stock appears stronger (all three states yield 
a positive payoff for the underlying stock). In set 2, the analogy is somewhat weakened 
due to the presence of a state with 0 payoff.4 One expects stronger results for set 1 when 
compared with set 2 if coarse thinking indeed matters. 
Table 3 
Parameters for Treatment 1 (T1) 
Price Type of Asset Red State (R) Blue State (B) Green State (G) 
? A  145 125 15 
100 1B  210 190 80 
80 2B  10 140 90 
100 3B  100 100 100 
 
Table 4 
Payoffs associated with A in each treatment 
 Red State (R) Blue State (B) Green State (G) 
T1 145 125 15 
T2 140 120 10 
T3 135 115 5 
T4 130 110 0 
T5 125 105 0 
T6 120 100 0 
                                                 
4 The precise measure of similarity between an option and its underlying stock is delta (Randleman (2002)). 
Delta ranges from -1 to 1, higher the value of delta, stronger is the similarity. The delta value in the first set 
is 1 where the delta in T5, and T6 is 0.96, and 0.92 respectively. Delta with respect to B2 is either zero or 
negative in all treatments whereas the delta with respect to B3 is negative in all treatments.  It is clear that 
there is no similarity between the call option and B2 or B3. Similarity exists between the call option and B1 
and is stronger in set 1 when compared with set2. 
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Table 5 shows the predicted prices of asset A  corresponding to each treatment under 
arbitrage-free pricing as well as coarse thinking. 
 
Table 5 
Treatment Arbitrage-Free Pricing (AFP) Coarse Thinking (CT) 
T1 35 59.38 
T2 30 56.25 
T3 25 53.13 
T4 20 50 
T5 19.22 47.92 
T6 18.43 45.83 
 
 
 3.3 Implementation of the Experiment 
 
In each treatment, each subject participates in 60 individual trials. Each subject acts 
individually and there is no communication between participants. Each participant’s task 
is to allocate 1000 francs between four assets; A , 1B , 2B , and 3B . Specifically, in each 
trial, every participant decides how many units of A , 1B , and 2B to buy or short. The 
remaining amount is invested in 3B . Participants are told that each state is equally likely 
to occur. As demonstrated in Bossaerts (2004), often in experiments, there may be a gap 
between announced and perceived uncertainty. To eliminate this possibility, algorithm for 
drawing the state is clearly explained to the participants. Participants are told that, at the 
end of each trial, a number will be randomly drawn from a discrete uniform distribution 
ranging from 1 to 90. If the number drawn is between 1 and 30 (including both limits) 
then the state realized is Red, if the number if between 31 and 60, the state is Blue, and if 
the number is between 61 and 90, the state is Green.  
The prices of 1B , 2B , and 3B are kept constant at 100, 80, and 100 respectively 
throughout the experiment. At the beginning of each trial, the price of A  is randomly 
drawn from a uniform distribution with the lowest payoff as the lower limit and the 
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highest payoff as the upper limit. This fact is known to every participant. As an example, 
in T1, the lower limit is 15 and the upper limit is 145. In T1, each time the price 
of A differs from 35, an arbitrage opportunity arises. Three constraints are imposed on the 
choices of each participant. Firstly, he or she cannot short more than 10 units of A  per 
trial. Obviously, if A is overpriced, a rational participant would want to short an infinite 
amount of A . Consequently, a restriction on the number of units that can be shorted is 
needed.  Secondly, we impose the following bankruptcy condition; net payoff in each 
state must be positive. This constraint is needed to guarantee a non-negative payoff to 
each participant. Finally, asset Amust be a part of the portfolio in every trial. Since Awill 
be overvalued in some trials and undervalued in others and our objective is to see how 
participants respond, it makes sense to impose this condition. 
The concept of shorting or selling without owning is typically not clear to many 
people. We took extra care in explaining the concept. Participants reluctant to sell 
because of unfamiliarity with short-selling would bias our results upwards. Participants 
were shown one example explaining why selling (shorting) an overvalued asset may be a 
good idea and another example explaining why buying an undervalued asset may be a 
good idea. 
 Once a participant has allocated funds among the four assets, a state is randomly 
(following aforementioned procedure) drawn and the payoff is announced to him or her. 
At all times, the history of trials is available to each participant for review. That is, each 
participant can see his or her past decisions as well as payoffs. 
 
4. Results 
 
Before discussing our results, it is useful to discuss the experiment in Rockenbach(2004). 
Rockenbach (2004) tests a number of hypotheses related to mental accounting against the 
benchmark of arbitrage-free pricing.  In that experiment, participants were presented with 
a call option along with the underlying stock and a bond. The questions of interest were: 
Are all three instruments considered jointly in a single mental representation as required 
by arbitrage-free pricing? Are there other mental representations with better explanatory 
powers? Possibilities tested were, a mental representation including the call and the 
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underlying stock, a mental representation including the call with the bond, or an isolated 
representation for the call option.  Rockenbach (2004) finds that these other mental 
representations have greater explanatory power than the hypothesis of arbitrage-free 
pricing.  Interestingly, a mental representation including the call with the underlying 
stock outperformed others. 
In the context of coarse thinking, a mental representation or account as used in 
Rockenbach (2004) can be thought of as an exogenously specified category. However, 
leaving the matter here is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. Firstly, it begs the 
question of where do these categories come from. In the absence of endogenization of 
categories, an alternative to the arbitrage-free pricing cannot be properly specified. 
Secondly, why did the mental representation including the call with the underlying stock 
outperformed others? Was this pure chance? Rockenback (2004) used a call option that 
yielded a positive payoff in all states. That is, the call option considered was highly 
similar to the underlying stock (delta =1). Do the results change if a call option less 
similar to the underlying stock is used (delta<1)? Finally, in the absence of a theory 
explaining the categories, tests of the notion of mental accounts require additional ad hoc 
assumptions. In particular, risk-neutrality was assumed in Rockenbach (2004). It 
naturally begs the question of whether the results carry over to more general preferences. 
Also, Rockenbach (2004) tests one specific application of the portfolio replication 
argument called the binomial option pricing model. The portfolio application argument is 
general and is also applicable to situations that admit more than two states. Here, we test 
the portfolio replication argument against the coarse thinking hypothesis when there are 
three states. 
The hypothesis of coarse thinking has the potential of addressing these concerns. 
The notion of framing allows for endogenization of categories. In the experiment, we test 
for framing by gradually altering the similarity between the call option and the 
underlying stock over 6 treatments. Analogy based pricing should vary as the similarity is 
varied. If coarse thinking indeed matters then some sort of a “structural break” should be 
seen as we move from set 1 (T1, T2, and T3) to set 2 (T4, T5, and T6). In this context, 
the experiment in Rockenbach (2004) can be considered roughly equivalent to a 
treatment belonging to set 1.  The notion of transference where an attribute from a 
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situation is transferred to another co-categorized situation is independent of risk-
preferences, thus, increasing the generality of results. Furthermore, the coarse thinking 
hypothesis has the potential of integrating different strands of literature in a 
comprehensive framework. As one example, Mullainathan et al (2008) provide possible 
explanations for a number of intriguing observations in industrial organization and 
finance. As another example, results in Rockenback (2004) can be viewed as a special 
case of coarse thinking.  
We follow Rockenbach (2004) in defining the separating price as follows. A 
separating price is a price P below which a participant buys the option and above which 
the participant sells the option. That is, it is the price that separates buying from selling. 
We do not directly observe separating prices, however, we do observe the decisions of 
participants (whether they buy or sell at a certain price). Separating prices can be 
statistically inferred from the observations as follows. Denote the price that a participant 
i faces in a trial t by itA . For treatment 1, suppose }145,...,,.........15{∈P is fixed and is the 
separating price.5 Subject i in trial t violates the assumption of the separating price if he or 
she fails to buy when PAit < or fails to sell when PAit > . Whenever there is a violation, 
we calculate the squared deviation as )( 2)( PAPD it −= . }145,...,,.........15{∈P that 
minimizes the sum of squared deviations is set as the separating price for the subject i .6 
We considered 4 phases for each subject in every treatment; trials (1-60)/overall, trials (1-
20), trials (21-40), and trials (41-60). For each subject, a separating price is calculated for 
each phase. Table 6 shows the average separating price (average of 30 subjects) in each 
treatment for each phase. It also shows the difference (in absolute value) between the 
average separating price over 60 trials and the arbitrage-free price (|Overall – AFP|) as 
well as the difference between the average separating price and the coarse thinking price 
(|Overall – CT|). As can be seen from the table, price with coarse thinking is much closer 
                                                 
5 For T2, the range is from 10 to 140. For T3, the range is from 5 to 135. That is, the payoff in state G is the 
lower limit and the payoff in state R is the upper limit in each treatment. 
 
6 In case of a connecting region with the lowest squared deviation, an average over the region is taken. It is 
easy to see that the points with the lowest deviation must be connected if there are multiple such points. 
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to the average separating price when compared with the arbitrage-free price in all 
treatments. 7 
 
Table 6 
Average Separating Price 
Treatment 1-60 (Overall) 1-20 21-40 41-60 |Overall-AFP| |Overall-CT| 
T1 65.19 69.74 63.85 64.92 30.19 5.81 
T2 62.34 65.88 61.70 60.57 32.34 6.09 
T3 60.03 62.34 60.85 59.61 35.03 6.90 
T4 59.27 61.78 58.16 57.13 39.27 9.27 
T5 59.42 62.23 59.64 58.44 40.20 11.5 
T6 57.96 59.11 57.74 57.16 39.53 12.13 
 
Next, we formally test for the closeness of price with coarse thinking with the average 
separating price as observed in our experiment by the Wilcoxon signed-rank test: 
 
0H : The differences (in magnitudes) between the average separating prices and the 
corresponding prices predicted by coarse thinking hypothesis are equal to the differences 
(in magnitudes) between the average separating prices and the corresponding arbitrage-
free prices. 
 
αH : The differences (in magnitudes) between the average separating prices and the 
corresponding prices predicted by coarse thinking hypothesis are smaller than the 
differences (in magnitudes) between the average separating prices and the corresponding 
arbitrage-free prices. 
 
                                                 
7 To convince ourselves that the notion of average separating price is indeed an accurate description of 
behavior, we did the following.  Treatment median of (per trial) average squared deviation from the 
separating price is calculated for each experience phase. In all treatments, the squared deviation from the 
separating price decreases with experience as confirmed by Friedman test. Hence, the behavior of 
participants becomes more and more in line with their respective separating prices as participants gain 
experience. 
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Wilcoxon test statistic has a value of 21 with a p-value of 0.025. Clearly, the 
coarse thinking hypothesis outperforms the hypothesis of arbitrage-free pricing in our 
experiment. 
Next we consider whether there is a significant difference in the performance of 
coarse thinking hypothesis (transference) between treatments in set 1 (T1, T2, and T3) 
and treatments in set 2 (T4, T5, and T6). The factor that differentiates the two sets is the 
zero payoff in the green state in all treatments that belong to set 2. The presence of a zero 
payoff reduces the similarity between the call option and the underlying stock making 
their co-categorization (consequently transference) less likely. The average difference 
between the predictions of coarse thinking hypothesis and the observed average 
separating prices in set 1 ((5.81+6.09+6.90)/3) is 6.27. This difference is smaller than the 
corresponding difference in set 2, which is ((9.27+11.5+12.13)/3) 10.97.  Table 7 
presents the mean squared errors between the separating price and the coarse thinking 
price in treatments in set 1 and set 2. These errors are calculated as follows. For each 
experience phase, and for each subject in each treatment, the squared difference between 
the separating price and the coarse thinking price is calculated. The squared differences 
so calculated are added for all 30 subjects in each treatment. The average squared 
differences are reported for set 1 and set 2 in table 7. 
 
 
Table 7 
Experience Phase MSE in Set 1 (T1, T2, and T3) MSE in Set 2 (T4, T5, and T6) 
1-60 14538.097 22777.819 
1-20 21849.162 26212.569 
21-40 18991.964 24585.582 
41-60 18571.788 25037.523 
 
As can be seen from table 6, the behavior of participants is more consistent with the 
hypothesis of coarse thinking in set 1 when compared with the behavior of participants in 
set 2. This is in line with expectations if coarse thinking hypothesis is indeed true. In set 
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2, the analogy between a call option and the underlying stock is considerable weakened 
due to the presence of a zero payoff in one state. 
 We have seen that the coarse thinking hypothesis clearly outperforms the 
hypothesis of arbitrage-free pricing. We find evidence indicating that coarse thinking 
matters for option pricing in a controlled laboratory experiment. Coarse thinking is an 
interesting hypothesis that demands greater empirical scrutiny.  This paper is a step in 
this direction. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Economics is primarily a study of how people make decisions. The traditional paradigm 
that assumes that people act as if they are emotionless geniuses while making decisions, 
has now given way to alternative approaches that admit limits on reasoning ability. 
However, saying that there are limits on reasoning ability is far from enough. The actual 
challenge is to provide a theory of where do these limits come about. An associated 
challenge is to show empirically that these limits actually matter in decision making.  
Coarse thinking hypothesis is a reflection of ideas from such diverse fields as 
psychology, linguistics, marketing, advertising, and politics. The essential idea is that 
people put situations into categories and then apply the same model of inference to all 
situations within a category. That way, the value assigned to an attribute in a given 
situation is affected by the values of the concerned attribute in other co-categorized 
situations.  We experimentally evaluate this idea in the context of option pricing. We 
tested whether coarse thinking or analogy based pricing matters for option pricing. 
Specifically, we tested whether the attribute of price is affected by coarse thinking. We 
find that indeed coarse thinking affects the way a call option is priced. 
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